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Abstract 
Conservation decisions increasingly involve multiple environmental and social 
objectives, which result in complex decision contexts with high potential for trade-offs. 
Improving social equity is one such objective that is often considered an enabler of 
successful outcomes and a virtuous ideal in itself. Despite its idealized importance in 
conservation policy, social equity is often highly simplified or ill-defined and is applied 
uncritically. What constitutes equitable outcomes and processes is highly normative and 
subject to ethical deliberation. Different ethical frameworks may lead to different 
conceptions of equity through alternative perspectives of what is good or right. This can 
lead to different and potentially conflicting equity objectives in practice. We promote a 
more transparent, nuanced, and pluralistic conceptualization of equity in conservation 
decision making that particularly recognizes where multidimensional equity objectives 
may conflict. To help identify and mitigate ethical conflicts and avoid cases of good 
intentions producing bad outcomes, we encourage a more analytical incorporation of 
equity into conservation decision making particularly during mechanistic integration of 
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equity objectives. We recommend that in conservation planning  motivations and 
objectives for equity be made explicit within the problem context, methods used to 
incorporate equity objectives be applied with respect to stated objectives, and, should 
objectives dictate, evaluation of equity outcomes and adaptation of strategies be 
employed during policy implementation  
 
Equity in Conservation 
 
Conservation decisions involve multiple objectives and result  in complex decision 
contexts with high potential for trade-offs and explicit conflict among stakeholders. 
Such trade-offs are common (Martin et al. 2008; Pfund 2010; Howe et al. 2014) and 
fraught with ethical dilemmas (Jax et al. 2013). Even when so-called win-win outcomes 
are socially and ecologically beneficial, they usually come at substantial opportunity 
costs for one or more stakeholders (McShane et al. 2011; Law et al. 2017). Conservation 
decision making, including the planning, prioritization, and implementation of 
conservation actions, needs to account for equity. Some stakeholders may receive or 
perceive they are receiving unfair treatment (Bennett 2016), and stakeholder responses 
to this may derail conservation interventions (Ferraro et al. 2007; Waylen et al. 2013). 
Equity is seen as both a virtuous policy ideal in itself and instrumental to the success of 
conservation and has become embedded in national and international conservation 
mandates. However, these mandates often lack practical conceptual and methodological 
clarity. For instance, the Convention on Biological Diversity Aichi Target 11 specifies 
that networks of protected areas must be “equitably managed” (CBD 2011), yet no 
operational definition of equity is provided, despite ongoing efforts to do so (Zafra-Calvo 
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et al. 2017). This emphasizes equity is a highly normative and multifaceted concept and 
thus, as a policy goal, can be highly contested and problematic to implement. 
Many normative guidelines exist related to stakeholder participation (Ives & Kendal 
2014) and general equity considerations (Robinson 2011). However, equity is included 
quantitatively in conservation planning and prioritization relatively superficially, for 
instance in simplified metrics of stakeholder needs or desires (Klein et al. 2010; Law et 
al. 2017) or indices of distributional factors (Halpern et al. 2013). Multiple equity 
objectives are rarely considered, especially those derived from different moral 
philosophies. This is problematic because alternative ethical frameworks can 
dramatically influence trade-offs between equity objectives (Dietz & Atkinson 2010). 
Given the idealized importance, prominence, and potential benefits of equity in 
conservation policy and decision making,, there is a need for a more sophisticated 
operational understanding (Jax et al. 2013). We sought to provide an overview of equity 
in conservation decision making by identifying motivations for considering equity, 
illustrating how alternative ethical frameworks influence what is considered equitable, 
and demonstrating how alternative equity objectives may conflict. Last, we considered 
the objectives and challenges of alternative methods for incorporating equity in 
conservation decision making, emphasizing that appropriate methods may differ based 
on the context, equity motivations, and objectives. 
Dimensions of Equity 
Equity, in simple terms, refers to fair or just treatment of individuals or groups. Here we 
applied the definition of equity established for environmental management (McDermott 
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et al. 2013) that has 3 dimensions: procedural, equitable involvement and inclusion of 
all  stakeholder groups in rule making and decisions; distributional , equitable 
distribution of costs, benefits, rights, responsibilities, and risk within and among groups 
from present and future generations; recognitional,  equitable respect for knowledge 
systems, values, social norms, and rights of all stakeholders in policy or program design 
and implementation; and contextual, equitable consideration of the broad social, 
governance, economic, and cultural contexts, past and present (e.g., power dynamics, 
gender, education, ethnicity, age), that influence an actor’s ability to gain recognition, 
participate in decision making, and lobby for fair distribution.  
Procedural, distributional, and recognitional dimensions can be incorporated 
directly in conservation plans. Contextual equity often defines what is necessary and 
enables or constrains achievement of equity in conservation initiatives. Stakeholders 
may include individuals or groups that affect, are affected by or otherwise have an 
interest in the problem context and decision process. In conservation decisions, 
stakeholders typically include consideration of elements of nature, either directly or via 
the expressed interest of human stakeholders. 
Motivations for Considering Equity 
Motivations for social equity inclusion in conservation decision making can be 
fundamental (virtues or ego) or outcome based (social or environmental) (Fig. 1). 
Fundamental motivations are embodied by the perception that equity – in processes 
and outcomes –is inherently right or valuable, whether or not it leads to support for 
conservation (Chan & Satterfield 2013). Outcome-based motivations result from 
framing equity as instrumental to achieving desirable ends. For example, increasing the 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
6 
equity of decision making processes or social outcomes may facilitate community 
acceptance of conservation decisions and result in a higher likelihood of success 
(Halpern et al. 2013; Bennett 2016). It is possible to be motivated by fundamental and 
outcome-based rationales simultaneously, maintaining both social and environmental 
values (Chan et al. 2016). We premised our argument on the idea that there are 
different motivations and objectives for including equity in environmental decision 
making (many of which are held simultaneously) and did not prejudging their relative 
merit or virtue. 
How Ethics Underpins What is Considered Equitable 
Ethical frameworks are the cognitive basis on which the desire for equity is motivated 
and on which equity is defined, planned for, and judged relative  to the 4 dimensions of 
equity described above. Ethics is the theory and practice of rational and reasoned 
deliberations when moral codes conflict. For example, Western philosophy 
distinguishes  3 broad schools of thought in normative ethics– consequentialism, 
deontology, and virtue. These respectively shift the focus of the ethical lens from the 
outcomes of actions, to the actions themselves, and to the inherent character of the 
actor (Table 1). 
Approaching a dilemma from different ethical stances can yield different solutions. In 
conservation triage, for example, the sacrifice of the most threatened species may be 
rationalized and accepted under a consequentialist framework based on a principle of 
the greatest good for the greatest number but challenged from a deontological 
perspective of the fundamental wrongness of allowing (or arguably facilitating) species 
extinctions and from a virtue-based principle of respect for all species (Wilson & Law 
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2016). These simplistic examples illustrate how underlying ethics affect perceptions of 
appropriate conservation action and result in different emphases being placed on 
contextual, recognitional, procedural, and distributional aspects of equity (Table 1). 
These examples are an incomplete representation of the diversity of ethics that may be 
present in conservation decisions (e.g., Callicott 1997; Rozzi et al. 2013). 
Conflicting Equity Objectives 
A diversity of ethical stances means that perspectives of what is equitable differ  and 
can conflict (Robinson 2011). This potential for conflict can be illustrated using 
formalized cake-cutting games. Cake-cutting games exemplify three facets of equity: 
recognition, who should play the game; procedure, what protocols are involved; and  
distribution, how much cake is allocated to each player. In the simple form of the game 
(2 players, no negotiation, one divisible and homogeneous cake), one player cuts the 
cake and the other takes the piece she or he   prefers . Theory predicts this will result in 
an equal distribution of cake and is a procedure where neither player envies the other’s 
piece of cake or the role of the other player (Brams & Taylor 1996; Robertson & Webb 
1998). 
This I cut, you choose method is generally Pareto efficient and envy free; however, equal 
pieces of cake, while providing outcome equality, may not necessarily be equitable in 
terms of equal utility. Each player’s subjective valuation of his or her piece is not 
necessarily equal to the others’ subjective valuation of their respective pieces (Nicolò & 
Yu 2008). For instance, if one player has a large appetite for cake and the other is 
watching their weight, then an equal division is not necessarily optimal, efficient, or 
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equitable in terms of utility, even if it is derived from a proportional, envy-free process 
(Nicolò & Yu 2008). 
This simple game shows the inevitability of an ethical dilemma in allocation decisions: 
conflict between procedural and distributional equity. Rarely do environmental 
problems involve only two players, however, and never do they concern only one, 
divisible, homogenous cake. Three or more players make the game more complex, and 
although strategies exist, they cannot be envy-free and result in equal proportions 
(Nicolò & Yu 2008). Thus, in practice, the notion of equity is intrinsically subjective and 
context dependent and involves trade-offs among equity objectives (Dietz & Atkinson 
2010). 
Matching Motivations with Methods in Conservation Practice  
Given the potential for conflicting equity objectives, how can trade-offs be managed best 
within a conservation-decision process? Quantitatively, conservation decision making is 
typically framed with utilitarian ethics, such as maximizing the utility of an outcome 
exemplified by the many systematic decision tools used to determine the optimal areas 
to protect for maximum species representation or actions to undertake for maximum 
species persistence (Moilanen et al. 2009). However, these planning tools are typically 
applied within a wider and often more qualitative decision making process to which the 
majority of ethical deliberations are often passed. We considered how different 
methods at different stages of this process can be used to address a range of ethical 
motivations and equity objectives and highlight where inappropriate use may result in 
perverse outcomes. 
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Defining Equity Motivations and Objectives within the Problem Context  
Motivations for considering equity within conservation need to be discerned as 
fundamental or outcome based, virtuous or self-serving, and focused on social or 
environmental outcomes (Fig. 1). These motivations form the guiding principles of the 
decision-making process: determining how the problem is conceptualized, the general 
objectives for equity within the process, and methods used to implement interventions 
and assess outcomes. For example, improving social acceptance of conservation 
implementation is an objective based on the community perception of the conservation 
project and requires extensive community participation (Martin et al. 2014), whereas 
determining how equality and cost-efficiency objectives trade off may not require public 
consultation (Halpern et al. 2013). Managing trade-offs effectively requires recognizing 
where important objectives (equity or otherwise) may conflict in the decision-making 
process or may not be achievable with available resources (e.g., if they are not tractable 
given the data and time available). Transparent communication of these motivations, 
objectives, and potential limitations is useful to manage expectations. 
Considering Preexisting and Potential Conflicts when Including Stakeholders 
Including stakeholders in decision making is commonly endorsed (Cowling et al. 2008; 
Pressey & Bottrill 2008; Knight et al. 2011). This ethic is sometimes motivated by a 
stakeholder’s perceived right to be included within or in control of a decision process 
that concerns them (i.e., recognitional and procedural equity [Fontana & Grugel 2016; 
Martin et al. 2016]) but is often also motivated by desires to account for all stakeholder 
preferences in a consequentialist framework (i.e., distributional equity [Law et al. 
2017]). Stakeholders can give voice to values that are more difficult to objectively 
quantify. Including stakeholders may also be motivated by the desire for outcome 
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effectiveness and efficiency, based on the assumption that including stakeholders leads 
to a better acceptance of the decision-making process and outcomes and thereafter to 
more successful implementation (Halpern et al. 2013). 
These ethical ideals may not eventuate, however, because equitable participation can be 
difficult to ensure (Goodwin 1998; Fontana & Grugel 2016; Martin et al. 2016). 
Negotiations are inherently argumentative processes that  involve information 
asymmetries and incentives to lie, posture, and exaggerate. Procedures can encourage 
stakeholders to act reasonably and honestly in their self-interest (e.g., by including 
third-party audiences, both legal and peer), but even these can be gamed (e.g., by 
initiating escrow bargaining mechanisms) or convergence can be forced to focal points 
rather than truthfully fair distributions (Brams & Taylor 1996). Focal points may be an 
equal distribution, which, as discussed above, may not be equitable. Alternatively, as is 
commonly seen in international forums, focal points may be vague or weak solutions 
(Maxwell et al. 2015) that  may be inequitable if they do not lead to substantive action. 
Given that many of the world’s most pressing environmental problems occur in socially 
and politically unstable contexts (Hammill et al. 2016), practicing conflict-sensitive 
identification and engagement of stakeholders should be of a higher priority  than 
merely including stakeholders (Gaynor et al. 2016; Martin et al. 2016). Conflict-sensitive 
conservation (Hammill et al. 2000) considers and accounts for the preexisting equity 
context – the causes, actors, and impacts of conflict –to minimize the negative impacts of 
conflict on social and environmental outcomes and maximize peace-building 
opportunities. The challenge presented by focal points emphasizes the need to revisit 
equity objectives regularly though the decision process and that no one approach to 
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equity is likely to be sufficient to deliver processes and outcomes that are equitable 
across all dimensions. 
Defining Metrics and Targets that Include Process and Outcome  
Metrics measure the concerns or values of stakeholders, whereas targets are a way of 
integrating stakeholder demand, entitlement, utility, and aspirations. Metrics and 
targets for multiple stakeholders are used in social-equity planning (Klein et al. 2010), 
where equity is defined as satisfying stakeholder objectives or minimizing trade-offs 
(Law et al. 2017). Metrics differentially reflect the values expressed by stakeholders, 
incentivize positive action, and minimize negative action (Law et al. 2015). Yet decision 
making is often based pragmatically on available data, which biases against values and 
concerns that are difficult to quantify, such as existence or cultural heritage (Martinez-
Harms et al. 2015). Defining threshold-based targets is complex and involves balancing 
the needs of sociopolitical feasibility and biophysical adequacy, avoiding perverse 
incentives, and ensuring adequate interpretations of underlying ethical principles 
(Carwardine et al. 2009; Hill et al. 2016). Underoptimistic targets could be inequitable 
or represent lost opportunity. However, overoptimistic targets can carry a high risk of 
failure (Blom et al. 2010; McShane et al. 2011), and some stakeholders may be burdened 
if risk levels exceed their risk preferences (Greiner et al. 2009; Estevez et al. 2015). 
Different methods to elicit individual and group stakeholder values and targets can 
profoundly influence conservation outcomes (Martin et al. 2012; Burgman et al. 2014; 
Burton-Chellew et al. 2015) due to bounded rationality (Burton-Chellew et al. 2015), 
varying levels of risk aversion (Greiner et al. 2009; Hintze et al. 2015), framing effects 
(Krupenye et al. 2015), group partiality (Hildreth et al. 2016), and other cognitive 
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limitations or biases (Iftekhar & Pannell 2015; Levine et al. 2015). Underlying values, 
which reflect the moral basis of ethical frameworks, are distinct from attitudes, which 
are explicit realizations of preferences in particular contextualized dilemmas (Ives & 
Kendal 2014). Equity implications of metrics and targets should consider the procedure 
(the metrics and targets applied and how they are measured or elicited) and the 
outcome (the resulting distribution of costs, benefits, and risk). 
Critically Assessing Equality Metrics for Measuring Equity 
Equity objectives may be specified explicitly as performance metrics during planning 
and prioritization, for example as a counterpoint to efficiency metrics in otherwise 
utilitarian-focused analyses (e.g. Halpern et al. 2013). The most commonly used metric 
of equity is the Gini coefficient (Maguire & Sheriff 2011; Halpern et al. 2013), a measure 
of equality (i.e., how evenly a resource is distributed among stakeholders) (Bellù & 
Liberati 2006; Maguire & Sheriff 2011). Other metrics include  the Thiel index (a 
weighted average of inequality within subgroups plus inequality among subgroups) and 
the 20:20 ratio (income from the top 20% of the population versus the bottom 20%). 
Equity metrics typically measure inequality, not inequity. Inequality metrics fail to 
consider, for instance, fairness or distributive justice and may fail to deliver an 
allocation that is efficient, socially optimal, or envy free. Equity metrics  differ in 
sensitivity to sample size and ability to detect and interpret changes in the metric as 
good or bad (Mackenbach & Kunst 1997; De Maio 2007; Maguire & Sheriff 2011). 
Correlations drawn between measures of social welfare and income inequality are not 
always consistent over time (Hiilamo & Kangas 2014) or theme (Fisher & Naidoo 2016).  
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Halpern et al. (2013) use a Gini coefficient to account for equity concerns in a 
prioritization of marine protected areas across multiple fishing communities. Although 
large gains in equality can be realized for little additional cost (i.e., reduction in 
efficiency), they note that their equality considerations may fail to generate “accepted” 
plans when “the needs or desires of particularly vocal or powerful minorities are not 
met” (Halpern et al. 2013). Equal allocations are fair when a resource is homogenous 
and all stakeholders can gain the same utility from their allocation (i.e., have the same 
needs, preferences, and capabilities). In the Halpern et al. (2013) example, unequal 
utility may arise from communities differing in the amount of fish needed to sustain the 
village (e.g., if villages have different populations or access to alternative resources that 
either increase their capacity to fish despite the restrictions or reduce their dependency 
on fishing) or if the original allocation was uneven.  For example, a community with a 
small custodial area may need to exploit proportionately more of that area to sustain 
the community than another community with access to a larger resource. Further 
ethical complications arise within communities  because stakeholder groups are not 
homogenous entities (Waylen et al. 2013). 
Although equality is a rational choice when preferences are unknown, engagement of 
stakeholders usually aims to reveal preferences (Cowling et al. 2008; Pressey & Bottrill 
2008; Knight et al. 2011). Further, strict equality is typically not preferred within 
societies, regardless of ethical stance (Dietz & Atkinson 2010; Martin et al. 2014). Thus, 
although incorporating equity metrics in conservation decision making can be useful, 
careful consideration of how they align with overall equity objectives is needed. 
Pursuing Efficiency or Equity 
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Environmental prioritization problems typically involve the (utilitarian) objective of 
efficiency – maximizing the benefit-to-cost ratio. The simplicity of this formulation 
belies the complexity of equity considerations: different types of benefits and costs, time 
frames, and how different stakeholder values are aggregated or disaggregated (Nyborg 
2012; Andrews & Entwistle 2014). Conservation decision making has typically focused 
on technical efficiency, a short-run approach assuming fixed resources, costs, and 
benefits (Moilanen et al. 2009). Other efficiency concepts include dynamic efficiency, 
which balances short-run management objectives with long-run monitoring objectives 
(Grantham et al. 2008; Grantham et al. 2009), and allocative efficiency, which equates 
supply with demand (Ando & Shah 2010). With Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
additional benefits for some stakeholders should only be made without cost to another,  
a criterion often applied to policy decisions (Stavins 2007). Pareto frontiers  are 
particularly useful in environmental management for analyzing the nature of trade-offs 
between objectives, clarifying possible and impossible solutions, and evaluating 
efficiency of current or planned allocations against this frontier (Law et al. 2017). 
Distributive efficiency aims to maximize social utility and is a focus of the sustainability 
and welfare literature (Andrews 2014; Herrera & Rosellón 2014). 
The different types of efficiency emphasize the trade-offs and links between efficiency 
and equity. Focusing on one definition of efficiency compromises the achievement of 
other formulations of efficiency, which will likely be detrimental to equity objectives. 
Although some types of efficiency may seem more focused on equity than others, equity 
and efficiency are fundamentally codependent. If one stakeholder can be made better off 
without detriment to another, then this is likely a more ethical approach to pursue 
(Martin et al. 2008; Dietz & Atkinson 2010; Halpern et al. 2013). Rarely are 
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environments managed optimally, however, and management may be so suboptimal 
that it may be more pragmatic in some cases to focus initially on allocations satisfying 
basic needs (i.e. adequacy) rather than efficiency. 
Facilitating, Monitoring, and Evaluating Equity in Implementation 
If equity is incorporated in conservation decisions to ensure an equitable or accepted 
outcome, then it follows that conservation interventions should be evaluated during and 
after implementation with respect to the equity objectives and modified, expanded, or 
terminated accordingly. Rarely are planned policies implemented optimally. 
Unintended outcomes may occur, particularly when interventions rely on the behavior 
of stakeholders. For example, land-clearing legislation may incite panic clearing 
(Whelan & Lyons 2005) and  endangered species policy may encourage preemptive 
destruction (Ferraro et al. 2007). Furthermore, what is considered equitable may 
change over time, particularly during periods of negotiation and reflection, and with 
changes in social and economic systems. Causal-inference approaches offer ways to 
robustly estimate policy impacts (Pfaff & Robalino 2012; Ferraro & Hanauer 2014; 
Baylis et al. 2016). Eliciting stakeholder perceptions of intervention outcomes offers a 
direct metric of stakeholder perceptions of equity (Bennett 2016), including of values 
less amenable to quantification, and, depending on equity objectives, can provide a 
useful adjunct or replacement of biodiversity metrics that may be more difficult, time 
consuming, or costly. 
Interventions relying on voluntary participation are perhaps most sensitive to variation 
because effort is not guaranteed and the motivational landscape may change during 
implementation. For example in private-land conservation, participants are often 
financially motivated ; however, personal circumstances, social and conservation 
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attitudes, place attachment, bequest values, nonmonetary costs, and networking, 
recreational, and educational opportunities are often equally if not more important 
(Moon & Cocklin 2011; Ma et al. 2012; Selinske et al. 2015). There may be trade-offs in 
regard to promoting broad participation, volunteer retention, and additionality 
(Armsworth et al. 2012). Moreover, crowding out may occur, wherein intrinsic moral 
obligations for conservation action are replaced by extrinsic finance or regulation 
(Moon & Cocklin 2011; Brown et al. 2015; Rode et al. 2015): an inefficient and likely 
inequitable outcome (Cooke et al. 2012). 
The right of self-determination (e.g., land tenure and customary rights) is a strong and 
recurring theme in discussions of environmental ethics. How then can a regional 
planner have any certainty of the outcomes? Arguably, regional level plans will always 
evolve during implementation (Pressey et al. 2013); however, allowing local 
governance institutions to have autonomy may exacerbate this. A novel approach to this 
problem treats the outcomes as uncertain. With this approach, planners could use 
decision-theoretic techniques that account for this uncertainty (Tulloch et al. 2013). 
Parcels could be allocated to community groups with the expectation that not all will be 
restored and that this outcome may be stochastic. This may allow planning at regional 
scales to occur with an accepted (and specified) level of certainty but preserve self-
determination at local scales. 
Discussion and Recommendations 
The importance of equity as an enabler for successful conservation and as a virtuous 
goal gives credence to the increasing prominence of equity in policy. This is challenged 
by the reality of diverse individual values, attitudes, and preferences, and, at least in 
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practice, that what is considered good or right is subjective and relative to social, cultural, 
historical, or personal circumstances. The conservation decision-making literature has 
focused on many equity dimensions: distributional, recognitional, procedural, and 
contextual. Although these are useful starting points for understanding equity, a 
nuanced understanding of how these can be incorporated at different stages of a 
decision-making process is critical, particularly how objectives may trade-off and how 
equity can be better integrated into quantitative planning and prioritization. Different 
concepts of equity can be drawn from a variety of ethical frameworks and further 
different equity objectives, although often not entirely independent, can conflict and are 
likely not commensurable. This potential pluralism of equity means that different 
concepts of equity are likely to be held by different stakeholders and that these varied 
equity objectives may not be mutually achievable. 
Such potential for trade-offs and conflict highlights the need for a more transparent and 
nuanced understanding of equity in conservation decision making. Starting with the 
premise of ethical pluralism, we identified 10 recommendations for a more nuanced 
integration of equity into conservation decisions (Fig. 2), organized into 3 guiding 
principles: defining motivations and objectives for equity within the problem context; 
planning for diverse stakeholders and equity objectives; and ensuring equity is achieved 
during implementation.  
We suggest that conservation decision-making  be guided by the concept of ethical 
pluralism. We see opportunity for a greater application of applied ethics in 
environmental decisions in terms of understanding the ethical stances of stakeholders 
(and incorporating these into conservation decision making  [e.g. Martin et al. 2014]) 
and examining how different institutional and policy approaches address different 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
18 
ethical dilemmas. We also see the potential for ethical pluralism to be incorporated into 
the design of more holistic measures and methods for assessing equity, given the 
increasing prominence of social equity in conservation actions. Such assessment 
frameworks may, for example, be differentiated by theme (e.g., social or environmental) 
and dominant motivations for incorporating equity. Performance metrics that factor in 
potential conflict among equity objectives may be required. Although incorporating 
equity into conservation decision making adds a layer of complexity to already 
challenging social and environmental decision contexts, we hope this complexity will be 
embraced and better conservation decisions will result. 
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Table 1: Three examples of normative ethical frameworks prominent in western 
philosophy that can be interpreted as emphasizing different definitions, approaches, 
and objectives in conservation decision making.*   
  Consequential
ism 
Deontology Virtue 
Broad 
definition and 
examples of 
Morality is 
contingent on the 
outcome. 
Morality is 
contingent on 
the actions 
Morality 
is based on 
inherent 
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potential 
principles 
Objectives aim to 
maximize good or 
minimize bad. 
examples include 
utilitarianism (the 
greatest good for 
the greatest 
number), 
hedonism 
(maximizing own 
pleasure), egoism 
(maximizing 
benefit for self), 
and altruism 
(maximizing 
benefit for others) 
themselves 
rather than the 
outcomes. 
Emphasis is on 
one’s duties and 
others’ rights. 
examples 
include the 
concepts of 
natural 
(universal) 
rights, divine 
command (the 
word of god), 
contractualism, 
and 
contractarianism 
(rights and 
duties mutually 
agreed on, focus 
on interpersonal 
and social 
relationships, 
respectively); 
character, 
not 
individual 
actions. 
examples 
include 
eudiamonism 
(practicing 
everyday 
activities that 
benefit 
personal 
well-being), 
agent based 
(character 
traits that 
are 
admirable), 
and the 
ethics of care 
(compassion, 
patience, 
nurture, and 
self-sacrifice) 
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can be 
conceptualized 
as pluralistic, 
including 7 
prima facie 
duties of 
benevolence, 
nonmaleficence, 
justice, self-
improvement, 
reparation, 
gratitude, and 
promise keeping 
Example 
equity 
objective in 
environmental 
decision 
making 
Increase 
acceptance and 
success of the 
decision 
Stakeholders 
should have a 
right to be in the 
decision-making 
process. 
As a 
decision 
maker, I 
want to be a 
good person. 
contextual 
equity  
considered in 
terms of 
perceptions of 
equity relative to 
past experience 
considered in 
terms of 
stakeholder 
capacity to 
participate fairly 
considere
d in terms of 
potential to 
right past 
wrongs 
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because costs and 
benefits are 
perceived relative 
to preexisting 
socioeconomic 
conditions 
recognition
al equity 
consideration 
of all major 
stakeholders that 
can influence 
success of 
implementation 
include all 
stakeholders 
who believe they 
have a stake. 
consider 
all 
stakeholders 
who believe 
they have a 
stake 
procedural 
equity 
emphasized to 
reduce conflict and 
improve 
ownership of final 
decisions 
emphasized 
to fairly allocate 
participation 
(voice) in 
decision-making 
process. 
emphasiz
ed to reduce 
conflict, and 
allow full 
participation, 
minimizing 
own voice 
distributio
nal equity 
emphasized to 
maximize 
acceptance by 
stakeholders and 
success of the 
less 
emphasized – 
allowed to be 
stakeholder 
driven 
emphasiz
ed in 
recognition 
of the 
inherent 
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policy worth and 
dignity of all 
stakeholders 
* In reality conservation decisions will include a much greater diversity of ethical 
concepts. 
Figure 1: Motivations for considering equity in environmental decision making. These 
different motivations influence which methods and actions are seen as right, 
appropriate, and useful to include in a conservation decision-making process. 
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Figure 2: Ten recommendations for a more nuanced integration of ethics into 
conservation decisions that considers trade-offs between equity objectives. 
 
